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This article was awarded the Julian Corbett Prize for Modern Naval History in 2003. It 
originated as a section of the author's Ph.D. thesis and thanks are due to the author's 
supervisor Dr. Lionel K. J. Glassey for his insight and advice and to the examiners of the 
thesis, Professors Richard Harding and Simon Newman, for their comments. Dates are in 
Old Style, except for a handful of instances when, either to avoid ambiguity or if the source 
has stipulated it, the New Style (N.S.) form is used. The year is taken to begin on I Jan. 
 
Abstract 
This article assesses the strategic and operational purpose of England's combined army-
navy operations within the European theatre during the Nine Years' War, 1688-97. 
Specifically, the historical consensus that these operations were simply a compromise 
product of the contemporary political discourse, and consistently suffered from poor 
preparation and implementation, is reassessed. In so doing, the article considers the 
combined service descents planned and executed against the northern French coastline 
between 1691 and 1694, including in particular the renowned operation at Brest in June 
1694, and also those operations undertaken by Admiral Russell's Mediterranean fleet in 
1695. Accordingly, the article argues that the strategic and operational dismissal of 
combined operations is based upon a misunderstanding of their contemporary purpose, and 
that these actions were in fact promoted by both the court and the ministry as strategic 
handmaidens to the wider continental and maritime strategies. 
 
In 1691 a pamphlet by Edward Littleton recommended that King William should undertake a 
'descent' (a seaborne landing of men on enemy territory) upon the French coast. It 
concluded with the claim that the responsibility of a skilful general was 'not to dance after the 
Enemy, but to make the Enemy dance after Him'; a combined army and navy operation to 
land soldiers on the French coast would cause Louis XIV to begin the jig.(1) Littleton's 
metaphor neatly encapsulated the principal strategic motive of descents in early modern 
warfare: the establishment of a second front in the enemy's territory, which would force him 
to draw resources away from the main theatre of operations. It also hinted at more 
immediate tactical objectives such as the destruction of a harbour, which might be completed 
as part of the wider strategic venture or form the sole object of the operation, but which 
would equally prompt an enemy response. Overall, despite the author's rather naive 
enthusiasm, the pamphlet outlined a positive case for this type of combined army and navy 
operation upon the French coasts.(2) 
 
Although Littleton was not alone amongst his contemporaries in making the military case for 
descents,(3) modern commentators have remained largely sceptical of the arguments. John 
Childs rejects the strategic and military worth of combined operations undertaken as 
descents upon the French coast during the Nine Years' War.(4) He condemns them as 
'political operations of war', which were 'poorly conceived and ill prepared'.(5) On both 
counts, Childs has much evidence to draw upon. The political dialectic between the whigs, 
who favoured a continental, army-centric strategy, and the tories, who preferred a more 
exclusively maritime or 'blue-water' strategy that promoted the navy in command of the sea 
while protecting and expanding overseas trade, did largely foster the European descents 
during the war. By combining army and navy resources to meet specific tactical or strategic 
objectives, the descents were considered structurally and functionally suited to fulfil certain 
aspects of both whig and tory strategies. At a more basic political level, the earl of Danby 
wrote of the propaganda benefits of effecting a landing directly on enemy territory.(6) On the 
second charge of poor planning and preparation, a history of failure can be found in the 
abandoned attempts against the Normandy coast and Brest in 1692 and 1693 respectively; 
in the bloody repulse at Brest in 1694; and in the lack of action by Russell's Mediterranean 
fleet, which had soldiers embarked aboard during 1695.(7) Nonetheless, Childs's 
condemnation of descents does, in the first instance, require a rather improbable rejection of 
the - admittedly now banal - Clausewitzian consensus about warfare being sui generis a 
political instrument.(8) And, more importantly, it assumes that London considered the 
descents to form a separate and coherent strategy. Clearly, within such a context the 
operational failures were lamentable, but, considered from a different standpoint, the extent 
and nature of these miscarriages becomes explicable. 
 
An alternative approach would be to consider these combined operations as just one 
element of the court's war policy: a product not purely of political compromise but a 
combined army and naval means to implement the separate military and naval strategies. 
This context in part supports the argument that descents might help to alter the military 
balance in the land theatre, although not sufficiently to comprise a single, war-winning 
strategy. It also implies that William appreciated this point with a greater degree of 
enthusiasm than is usually accorded to him, and that, along with senior courtiers and 
commanders, he sought to organize a series of descents as one aspect of his continental 
strategy.(9) Equally, with reference to the wider naval strategy, this interpretative framework 
adopts descents as just one agency for its implementation. Although command of the 
Narrow Seas had been achieved at La Hogue (1692), the French navy had not been 
destroyed and the two principal squadrons operating out of Brest/Rochefort in the north and 
Toulon in the south could still combine to form a considerable battlefleet. There was much to 
recommend destroying these vessels as they lay in port to guarantee sea command; and, 
aside from seaborne bombardment, a combined army and navy descent offered a means to 
do so. This approach was underlined when, from 1694, the French naval strategy evolved to 
promote guerre de course above guerre d'escadre; the coastal ports now served as havens 
for the privateers preying on English trade and the naval warships that afforded them 
escort.(10) In attempting either to prevent the conjunction of the French squadrons or to 
combat the French guerre de course, the descents planned against the northern French 
coasts might also be considered as facilitating William's ambition to establish England as the 
principal Mediterranean seapower. As part of this ambition, descents were considered as an 
instrument for destroying shipping in the southern as well as the northern ports. More 
importantly, in 1695 after the main fleet had wintered in the Mediterranean for the first time, 
descents were perceived as a means of intervening in the war on the Iberian peninsula, and 
in particular at Catalonia, where the due de Noailles's army had made significant gains 
against the Spanish and was threatening the region's principal town, Barcelona.(11) 
 
A consideration, therefore, of the historical evolution of this alternative context in which to 
assess the descents undertaken by England in Europe during the Nine Years' War, including 
an explication of the planning and preparation, should indicate the level of political support 
for, and perception of, these combined operations. If, as conjectured above, it is possible to 
describe descents as handmaidens of the separate continental and maritime strategies and 
not as an independent war-winning strategy, then Childs's interpretation of such operations 
would seem to be open to question. 
 
The claim that the planned descents of the early sixteen-nineties resulted only from the 
king's providing 'reluctant lip service to the idea' (12) sits oddly beside William's expressed 
interest in such projects even before Ireland was conquered. In February 1691, the Allied 
Conference held at The Hague discussed proposals for a descent into France and, although 
William was then sceptical about the plan's practicalities, within four months he ordered that 
preparations begin. This change of mind was partly because Secretary Nottingham kept the 
proposal on the executive council's agenda, despite Sydney's representations of the king's 
initial reluctance. More importantly, Ginkel's successful start to the 1691 Irish campaign at 
Galway and Aughrim raised the prospect that troops might soon be spared for service 
elsewhere. Rather than ship them immediately to Flanders, the king was willing to deploy 
them in a descent. 
 
Despite William's order and Nottingham's claim that the council was working on the project, 
no detailed planning was undertaken and only Danby, in consultation with Leinster and other 
French Huguenots, put forward any firm proposals. Their ideas for descents on the River 
Gironde or on the Normandy coast accorded with the arguments that Littleton put forward in 
his pamphlet regarding the military benefits which could accrue from such an attack, but as 
the summer lengthened, preparations had still not begun. By August, Sydney's 
representations that the king was lukewarm about the idea because of the lateness of the 
season and his desire for a naval action were gaining credit. William's reputed coolness was 
probably a consequence of the military momentum in Ireland stalling once again in front of 
Limerick's walls, ensuring that there would be no early release of soldiers from that theatre; 
and, as the siege dragged through to the autumn, it was indeed becoming too late in the 
season. All residual hope that the project might be advanced was extinguished in early 
October when Nottingham told Ginkel to expect that, on the conclusion of the peace treaty in 
Ireland, many of the soldiers would be transferred to Flanders.(13) 
 
Nonetheless, in early spring of the following year, the idea of a descent on the northern 
French coast was firmly back on the agenda. A memorandum sent by Nottingham to 
Blathwayt on 3 March noted that a descent would take place towards the end of May and 
that some twenty English and Dutch infantry battalions, along with a couple of English 
regiments of horse and one of dragoons, would comprise the land force. Along with details 
about the transportation arrangements for these troops and the artillery train, the 
memorandum revealed that the king had spoken only to the prospective commanders - 
Admiral Russell, the duke of Leinster and the earl of Galway - about the plan. The fact that 
the king had kept other senior courtiers in the dark probably contributed to the proposal's 
lack of political support when it was presented to the cabinet council advising Queen Mary 
after William's departure to the European continent for the 1692 campaign. Indeed, 
Godolphin and a coterie of like-minded colleagues managed to hold up the preparations until 
the king provided further evidence of his intentions in the matter. However, even when this 
was received, the operation's organization continued to suffer delay when, in mid April, the 
council's attention was diverted to preparing the nation's defence against an imminent 
French invasion on behalf of the exiled King James.(14) 
 
The death of Louis XIV's war minister, Louvois, in 1691 had removed from Versailles the 
principal bulwark against French policy focusing upon a Jacobite restoration, and the French 
king was soon persuaded to sponsor another attempt by James to reclaim his kingdoms. In 
early 1692, the French Channel and Mediterranean fleets - save for a thirty-five-strong 
squadron which was to winter in the Mediterranean — had been combined in the Channel 
under the comte de Tourville, while a sizeable expeditionary force was collected along the 
Normandy coast. However, its organization proved slow and it was not complete when 
London became aware, through captured papers, of the French plans. To preserve the 
preparations already completed, Tourville was ordered to engage the Anglo-Dutch fleet 
commanded by Russell that had been dispatched from England to intercept. Under the gaze 
of James, standing on the cliffs above, the two fleets clashed off Cape La Hogue on 19 May 
and, after five days of fighting, Russell had not only defeated Tourville but had also 
destroyed much of the infrastructure for the invasion force.(15) John Ehrman implies that the 
idea of a descent on the Normandy coast arose from the deliberations as to how best the 
victory at La Hogue might be followed up.(16) However, as has been shown, the idea had 
been current almost since the start of the war and a specific proposal had already been 
agreed upon for 1692. Undoubtedly, though, Russell's victory provided an impetus to the 
preparations begun by Nottingham in late March. 
 
Prior to the invasion emergency, it was Admiral Russell who had proposed a specific target 
for the descent — St. Malo. Admittedly, his selection was based on the assumption that it 
would force the French to a sea engagement but, immediately following La Hogue, he 
remained convinced that a landing should still be effected around that area of the Normandy 
coast, believing that it would most effectively capitalize upon French vulnerability. 
Significantly, however, he implied that for this opportunity to be grasped the descent force 
would have to be ready forthwith.(17) As Russell was returning to Spithead, the cabinet 
council resolved to dispatch three of its members — Portland, Rochester and Sydney — 
along with Galway, to meet with the admiral and Leinster at Portsmouth to determine upon a 
specific target. From the — albeit limited - evidence of the meeting, it would seem that no 
decision was made and that, instead, it was agreed that the fleet should reconnoitre the 
coast to determine the disposition of the remaining French naval forces. Francis Bickley 
rightly concludes that this decision reflected the land force's lack of readiness.(18) Leinster's 
efforts in this respect had been frustrated by the delays in bringing troops from Ireland and 
by the measures effected to combat the invasion threat; while a general lack of funding had 
also undermined his organization. Further problems threatened in June when the duke faced 
a recall demand from William for those horse regiments initially detailed to be transported to 
Flanders but which had remained behind to form part of the descent force. It was only as a 
result of Nottingham's entreaties that this was averted.(19) There was no doubt, however, 
that William was becoming annoyed at the inertia and, through Blathwayt, he demanded a 
more specific explanation about what was currently proposed 'than by the Generall words of 
a Descent'.(20) 
 
Although there seemed to be an unexpressed consensus that St. Malo would be the target, 
Nottingham could barely reply to the king in any accurate detail. Moreover, by July, Russell 
began to set his whole face against the enterprise. Following his meeting with the three 
members of the cabinet council at the end of May, the admiral had undertaken a further 
reconnaissance voyage and had concluded that the coastline was too dangerous for the 
larger rates and that, in general, St. Malo was not a practicable target as the season 
progressed. Given the time and political currency he had expended in trying to bring the plan 
to fruition, Nottingham was concerned about Russell's increasing intransigence. He sought to 
regain the admiral's support for the venture but, at this important juncture, the secretary's 
correspondence did not prove sufficiently tactful. By suggesting that Russell would not want 
to leave himself open to the charge that he had failed to do everything possible to make the 
descent plan work, it seemed to the admiral that Nottingham was not only criticizing his 
actions to date but also preparing the political ground for him to be blamed for any 
subsequent failure. Accelerated by their political differences - Nottingham was a high church 
tory and Russell a whig - relations between the two men quickly deteriorated, to the 
detriment of the descent plan. With little contribution from Leinster, the debate as to whether 
the descent was to proceed and, if so, what its target should be continued throughout 
July.(21) 
 
Towards the end of the month, Leinster embarked the troops and the transports weighed to 
fall in with the fleet as it sailed up the Channel from Torbay. With both component parts of 
the descent force now together, and with the queen having specifically recommended to 
Russell that the operation should be deployed to burn St. Malo, in addition to considering the 
possibility of an attack on Brest in light of intelligence that a number of French vessels had 
proceeded to that port, Nottingham might have anticipated action. However, on 28 July, a 
joint service council of war aboard the Bredah concluded that it was not practicable to attack 
St. Malo and, further, that it was too late in the year to make any attempt against Brest or 
Rochefort (also previously canvassed as a target). Russell's influence over this decision was 
evident from the letter that he wrote to Nottingham following the council, in which he justified 
its resolutions in detail. Moreover, doubtless guided by the admiral, the council was not 
minded to alter its decision when Russell received the queen's recommendation regarding 
the burning of St. Malo. Strictly, the council had not disobeyed the queen as she had not 
issued a direct order, but its resolutions were clearly contrary to her wishes and, perhaps as 
an attempt to soften the decision, the council agreed that the fleet would put in at St. Helens 
where it could be kept together, ready to consider any commands from the queen. In an 
attempt to resolve this deadlock between the wishes of the court and the ministry on one 
side, and those of the descent commanders on the other, Nottingham and the available 
members of the cabinet council — Carmarthen, Devonshire, Dorset, Rochester, Sydney and 
Cornwallis - travelled to Portsmouth at the beginning of August to meet with Russell and the 
other senior commanders. However, at their meeting with the council of war, the politicians 
were not able to prevail upon the servicemen to undertake an attack against St. Malo, or 
indeed anywhere else on the Normandy or Brittany coasts.(22) As Nottingham laconically 
reported to Portland, the cabinet council members returned to London having 'succeeded in 
nothing that we designed'.(23) The projected descent against the Normandy coast, which 
had been current since early March, was now finally abandoned, and, for the immediate 
future, attention was focused upon an alternative joint army-navy operation that the king had 
proposed just before the Normandy descent was given up. 
 
William's target was one of France's principal harbours for privateers and the most northerly 
point of the frontier with the Spanish Netherlands - Dunkirk. On this occasion the operation 
was not to be a seaborne descent, but rather two separate, although co-ordinated, attacks 
from the land and sea. The intended troops (save for some 200 dragoons and the regiments 
of Foulkes and Hales, the two latter intended for an overseas expedition to the West Indies) 
were currently part of the descent force with the fleet at St. Helens. William planned to land 
them at Ostend or Nieuport whence they would march overland with reinforcements to attack 
the town of Dunkirk. Meanwhile, the fleet which had transported them would undertake a 
seaborne bombardment against its port.(24) 
 
Given the vacillation over the planned descents for the northern French coast, the Dunkirk 
operation has, perhaps with some justification, been labelled as 'face-saving'.(25) William did 
not, however, know for certain when he designed the operation that the descents against St. 
Malo or Brest had been aborted, and, in fact, he made the Dunkirk assault conditional upon 
a final decision being taken to abandon operations. Although Blathwayt privately informed 
Nottingham that the king anticipated their abandonment, that is not to suggest that the 
Dunkirk project possessed no merit as a combined army and navy assault outside the 
context of operational failure elsewhere.(26) 
 
William had previously targeted Dunkirk in January as a first strike for the 1692 campaign 
and it was probably only the fact that the French got wind of the design which caused it to be 
shelved.(27) Now, later in the year, William was returning to the project and hoped to make 
effective use of the military and naval resources brought together for the proposed northern 
coast descents. His commitment to the success of the venture -as opposed to just being 
seen to being doing something with the gathered forces — is illustrated by the blanket of 
secrecy which he threw over details of the operation. Although William's adjutant, Colonel 
Withers, who carried the details about the project to Nottingham, had instructions which 
allowed for the service commanders to be briefed in full, it would seem that in the first 
instance this did not occur. Leinster did not know the exact target until he was landed at 
Ostend; and London - aside from select senior ministers - assumed that, with the 
abandonment of the proposed descents, the troops were being transported to the Flanders 
theatre, albeit in the direction of Dunkirk.(28) 
 
The early organization of this enterprise contributed to the belief that William was only 
transferring troops. Based on the instructions delivered to Nottingham, the queen ordered 
Russell to detach a squadron of some eight men-of-war from his fleet at St. Helens to 
convoy the transport ships with Leinster's troops on board and the auxiliary store vessels 
containing the large descent train to the Downs or Margaret Road where further orders were 
to be sent. Russell appointed Shovell to command this detachment, which included Dutch 
vessels and, since only the dragoons and the two regiments bound for the West Indies had 
to be disembarked, the squadron proceeded quickly up the Channel. Once at the Downs, the 
instructions which Shovell and Leinster received from the king proved only a little more 
specific, informing them that the troops and war stores were to be landed at Ostend or 
Nieuport by 22 or 23 August. A separate memorandum attached to the order anticipated a 
visit to the squadron by Withers to inform the two commanders of the king's orders but it 
remains unclear just how much he revealed. At the Downs, sickness spread amongst the 
soldiers and in a tersely worded letter to Nottingham regarding the management of this 
problem, Leinster condemned the fact that he was still ignorant about how his troops were to 
be deployed.(29) 
 
The outbreak of disease proved not to be as serious as Leinster had represented and, 
although some men were put ashore, it did not hinder the squadron's passage across the 
Channel. The troops were in fact landed at Ostend in advance of the prescribed dates. It was 
then that orders to march towards Dunkirk with the reinforcements of engineers were sent to 
Leinster, while Portland also visited him at Ostend to provide further explanation.(30) It is 
difficult to know exactly when Shovell was informed that he was to lead his squadron against 
Dunkirk's port as one element of a combined attack on that town. As bomb vessels were 
initially ordered as part of his convoy along with pilots for the Flanders coast, and he was 
instructed to meet with Meester's 'Machine Vessels' if possible,(31) Shovell might have 
guessed more about the operation than Leinster. Or perhaps Withers was more candid with 
Shovell, although given Leinster's seniority and reputed closeness to the king that seems 
unlikely. Shovell probably received more detailed instructions at the same time as Leinster 
given that he then wrote briefly to Nottingham about the squadron's disposal for the attack, 
upon which Blathwayt later expanded. This correspondence revealed that the Dutch Admiral 
Evertsen would lead a detachment of smaller vessels inshore to bombard the harbour and 
explode some of Meester's 'Machines', while Shovell would remain outside with the larger 
ships to combat any sea-based opposition or relief.(32) 
 
In the event, neither commander acted upon his orders. A week after Portland's meeting with 
Leinster at Ostend, the troops were only encamped just east at Veurne whence Leinster 
marched south-eastwards to Dixmonde, instead of pressing forward due west to attack 
Dunkirk. Shovell for his part struggled offshore with poor weather which prevented his well 
boats from tracking the army as it marched. This was essential for a co-ordinated assault but 
would, in any case, have become impossible once Leinster turned his troops towards the 
interior.(33) Blathwayt's insouciance in reporting home Leinster's actions by claiming that he 
was preparing winter quarters to the allies' advantage perhaps reflected his hitherto low 
expectations of the enterprise, but it obscures the reasons why Dunkirk was no longer the 
immediate target. Furthermore, the secretary-at-war failed to elaborate when the orders for 
the embarkation of Leinster's troops were issued in mid September, having contended that 
the occupation of Veurne and Dixmonde was all that the general could achieve. Portland and 
Cambon, after visiting Leinster at Ostend, had reported difficulties with the proposed attack, 
although no specific details were offered. Thus, aside from the increasing lateness of the 
season and the bad weather hampering the co-ordination of the naval and military attacks, 
there is little else to suggest why the assault on Dunkirk was dropped.(34) Bickley's 
conclusion that, unlike the earlier planned descents, the venture against Dunkirk had at least 
been begun misrepresents the nature of the planned combined operation.(35) As previously 
noted, it was not to be a seaborne descent but a co-ordinated attack from the land and sea; 
thus, although the landing of the troops at Ostend was a prerequisite for the attack, it did not 
mark its beginning. That event was forestalled by Shovell's squadron being beaten off the 
coast and, more importantly, by Leinster marching to Dixmonde. The combined operation 
against Dunkirk had been abandoned just like the other descents against the northern 
French coast. 
 
It might be reckoned a measure of William's commitment to descents as part of his war 
policy that, despite the experiences of the previous year, his speech at the opening of the 
parliamentary session in November 1692 indicated his intent to mount a larger descent as 
part of the forthcoming campaign.(36) Although parliament first began picking over the traces 
of the previous summer's failed attempts, with debate developing into a celebrated contest in 
apportioning blame between the tory and whig supporters of Nottingham and Russell,37 
preparations for another descent were initiated at the turn of the year. Neither Russell nor 
Nottingham emerged with much credit from the parliamentary deliberations but it was the 
admiral whom the king decided to replace for the forthcoming campaign, refusing to 
capitulate to Russell's threat to resign if he had to receive orders from Nottingham. In 
Russell's place, a triple commission of Killigrew, Delavall and Shovell was appointed to 
command the fleet in a similar manner to Killigrew, Ashby and Haddock in 1690. To the relief 
of Russell's defenders, however, Nottingham suffered a reverse in March when the king 
completed some ministerial changes to the whigs' advantage in an attempt to build a majority 
in parliament. Two such changes were the removal of Nottingham to the southern 
department, and the appointment of the implacable whig Sir John Trenchard to the second 
secretaryship of state, which had lain vacant since Shrewsbury's departure. Although it had 
been Nottingham's suggestion that the post be filled to ease his administrative burdens, 
Trenchard would certainly not have been his preferred choice.(38) 
 
In addition to his new appointment as secretary for the northern department, Trenchard 
assumed responsibility for naval affairs and consequently for the co-ordination of the 
preparations for the descent. Deliberations by the admiralty and cabinet council before and 
after the king's departure for the continent resolved upon Brest as the target for 1693. 
Specifically, the aim was to destroy the French fleet commanded by Tourville which had 
congregated in the port after La Hogue, and thus to prevent its conjunction with d'Estrees's 
squadron based at Toulon. The exact disposition for the attack was to be left to a council of 
war called by the admirals for, on this occasion, no general officer was appointed to 
command the five regiments which would comprise the land force.(39) Not all ministers 
supported the project and those at the treasury in particular complained about what they 
calculated to be the disproportionate costs of the enterprise.(40) Despite these doubts, 
Blathwayt represented that William was sufficiently relaxed about the estimated £55,000 cost 
of the expedition to apportion a further £22,000; while the secretary also reported that the 
king believed 'something considerable' could be undertaken at Brest.(41) 
 
The destruction of the enemy fleet in the port was contingent upon the descent being 
undertaken early in the season before the French put to sea. Preparations were pushed 
forward at Portsmouth, and the regiments were quickly moved to camps in Sussex and 
around Winchester in Hampshire where supplies were more plentiful and convenient than 
the alternative camp at Hounslow Heath. Moreover, it was thought that, as these camps 
were closer to Portsmouth, the French might be alarmed that the embarkation of the troops 
was imminent. Only the confusion over the amount of bedding to be provided by the 
Admiralty for the soldiers on board the fleet, and a debate which arose over the authority of 
naval captains to discipline the troops when on board, caused delay. These matters were, 
however, in the process of being clarified when the order was issued at the beginning of May 
for the admirals to embark the soldiers.(42) 
 
It has been claimed that no embarkation took place and, indeed, that the descent upon Brest 
was dropped as the admirals were ordered in late May to provide additional escort to the 
outgoing Smyrna convoy - the Levant fleet of merchantmen which Vice-Admiral Rooke's 
squadron had been ordered to escort in January i693.(43) Delays had prevented its 
departure and on hearing in May that Tourville had left Brest to join d'Estrees to attempt an 
ambush of the convoy, William thought it prudent that Rooke leave immediately. The cabinet 
council, however, appreciated that a quick departure was unlikely and suggested instead 
that the main fleet should also accompany the convoy.(44) This did not mean that the 
descent had been abandoned. Blathwayt had previously confided to Nottingham the king's 
desire that any measures taken for the Mediterranean trade should not hinder the descent 
project, and when members of the cabinet council went to consult with the admirals about 
the naval campaign the assault upon Brest was still on the agenda. When the orders to 
accompany Rooke were sent to the admirals, two regiments were embarked and they were 
to be followed by a further two with the fifth (for an unknown reason) left ashore. Moreover, 
these orders only required the admirals to accompany Rooke as far as they thought 
appropriate. This left them with both the discretion and the opportunity to undertake the 
attack on Brest, although the intelligence that Tourville had left the harbour negated the 
original objective.(45) This intelligence was, however, unconfirmed (Tourville did not in fact 
leave Brest until the end of May)(46) and, on their departure with the Smyrna convoy, the 
expectation was that the admirals would seek an opportunity to assault Brest. 
The opportunity failed to present itself throughout the summer. After initially deciding that the 
main fleet would accompany Rooke's squadron thirty leagues past Ushant, the admirals 
agreed to continue for a further twenty. This reflected their lack of intelligence on the 
movements of the French fleet, and much of the early part of the summer was spent trying to 
guess the whereabouts of Tourville and d'Estrées. To begin with, the admirals believed that 
the Toulon squadron had put into Brest, although it was not until Rooke had departed that 
the earlier reconnaissance of Brest harbour was followed up. This confirmed that it was 
empty and the admirals then turned their attentions to a fruitless search for Tourville in the 
immediate vicinity. In the event, Tourville had sailed south to join d'Estrées to effect the 
ambush of the Smyrna convoy, which they achieved in Lagos Bay just round from Cape 
Vincent on 17 June.(47) 
 
Although it was towards the end of August when the council of war officially abandoned the 
descent on Brest because of lateness of the season, in reality it was the earlier confirmation 
that its harbour was empty which had sounded the death knell of the descent. Unable, then, 
to prevent the joining of the French squadrons, the descent was rendered functionally 
irrelevant as an aspect of the naval strategy. This was confirmed when the additional 
provisions prepared for the assault were apportioned to alternative services soon after the 
June reconnaissance; while at the beginning of July, the field officers were set ashore and 
the artillery train and the auxiliary transport vessels were discharged.(48) As London had 
become increasingly concerned for the security of Rooke's squadron, the main fleet was 
ordered to set out to his aid. Lack of provisions and poor weather, however, prevented the 
fleet from sailing before word came through of the ambush. Thereafter, it continued cruising 
in the Soundings until the admirals' requests that the ships be laid up for the winter were 
granted at the beginning of September. Within a month the admirals were given leave to 
come to London to face the gathering political storm over the destruction of the Smyrna 
convoy. For the third year in succession, a descent had been prepared as a significant part 
of the king's war strategy only for it to be abandoned as other circumstances demanded 
more immediate attention. This type of combined operation would nonetheless be back on 
the war agenda in the following year, and it would then finally go ahead. 
 
Two years after publication of his 1691 pamphlet proposing a descent on the French coast, 
Littleton wrote a sequel.(49) He criticized the descent projects undertaken over the past two 
years for being either raids or grandiose invasion ventures aimed at capturing an enemy 
stronghold. The first he considered morally reprehensible and the second false economy in 
terms of men and resources. Littleton's ideal descent would instead aspire to seize a weak 
point on the enemy coast, fortify it and then maintain a small garrison. This would cost 
England little and, with the majority of troops re-embarked to attend to other descents, 
several footholds could be created along the enemy coast, thereby critically stretching their 
resources. His emphasis was on the strategic priority of establishing a second front upon 
enemy territory rather than on capturing an enemy town or port for immediate tactical 
reasons. It is unclear whether Littleton would have approved of William's determination to 
assault Brest in 1694 in order to prevent the French squadron based there from leaving for 
the Mediterranean and joining with the Toulon squadron, thereby raising the prospect that 
the combined fleet might wreak the havoc on English trade that it had the previous year. At 
one level this descent would be the tactical capture of Brest to destroy the harbour and the 
ships anchored within. At another level, it would be the implementation of William's 
developing ambitions that England be the principal power in the Mediterranean. As this 
would establish intervention on another front (albeit one projected from the sea), the 
descent's strategic credentials must also be recognized. 
 
Following the failures of 1693, a decision in principle to attack Brest in 1694 was taken 
during the winter of 1693-4 and not, as Childs contends, in the spring of 1694. A rendezvous 
was fixed for the fleet at the Downs at the beginning of March, but it was mid April before this 
was completed, and by then events in the Mediterranean had forced a rethink of the plan.(50 
At the end of November 1693, Rear-Admiral Wheeler, recently returned from his fruitless 
expedition to the West Indies and North America, had been sent to the Straits with a 
squadron to convoy trade and provide succour to the Spanish along their Mediterranean 
coastline. In February Wheeler's squadron was caught in a violent storm as it made its way 
through to the Middle Sea and the rear-admiral went down with his ship, along with five other 
vessels. Although the remainder of the squadron made it into Gibraltar Bay, England was 
now without any effective naval presence in the Mediterranean either to pressurize the 
French in that theatre or — and more importantly in the City's opinion - to provide protection 
for trade.(51) It now seemed imperative that the French fleets should not combine and the 
instructions issued on 24 April to the re-appointed admiral of the fleet and newly-appointed 
head of the Admiralty commissioners, Edward Russell, anticipated that he might have to 
chase the French fleet south to prevent such a juncture if it had quit Brest before an assault 
could be mounted.(52) 
 
The political fall-out from the Smyrna convoy debacle had claimed Nottingham as its 
principal victim and adversely affected the two obviously tory admirals of the joint command - 
Delavall and Killigrew - more than Shovell, thus marking another milestone on William's 
political journey away from mixed ministries to his mid-decade reliance upon the whigs. 
Russell, therefore, largely owed his appointments not just to the failures of the joint 
commanding admirals but to the increasing political ascendancy of the whigs with whom he 
was identified.(53) It was certainly not the result of his commitment to descents, about which 
he had been unenthusiastic in 1692. On receiving his instructions of 24 April, he again began 
to question their feasibility in correspondence with the duke of Shrewsbury (lately returned to 
the ministry as secretary for the northern department).(54) 
 
Russell's principal criticism, that chasing the French fleet southwards could not be 
undertaken in conjunction with a descent on Brest, was based on a misinterpretation of his 
orders. As part of William's strategy, the priority of the instructions of 24 April was to stop the 
Brest fleet from entering the Mediterranean to combine with the Toulon fleet: the assault on 
Brest harbour and the chase were merely possible options to that end, depending upon the 
current intelligence of the enemy's whereabouts.(55) Russell's error was understandable, for 
the idea that both options would be pursued was driven by the administrative preparations of 
the descent which, having suffered an early delay, continued independently of the refinement 
of the instructions upon fresh intelligence altering the operational context. 
Although late, and with many of the seamen unpaid, Russell's fleet had managed to 
assemble at Spithead by the end of April. There was, however, still no sign of the auxiliary 
store ships, the artillery train, nor indeed of the ten infantry battalions which were to comprise 
the land force for the descent.(56) The senior English general, Thomas Tollemache,(57) had 
been appointed to command these troops in mid April, but it was the beginning of May 
before they had encamped at Portsdown Hill above Portsmouth. Nearly a fortnight later, on n 
May, Tollemache announced that they were ready to embark, but by then Russell had taken 
those ships in the fleet which had been paid upon a reconnaissance mission, and this 
confirmed the departure of the French fleet under the command of Châteaurenault from 
Brest harbour — presumably bound for the Mediterranean. Russell was furious that the 
descent force had been delayed, for Brest was then seen to be weakly defended by only the 
town's militia and a couple of regular infantry companies. The master-general of the 
ordnance, Lord Sydney, was the main target of his ire, being labelled by the admiral a 
'driveller'.(58) Again, with preparations for the descent force continuing in his absence, 
Russell had assumed that the descent on Brest had an additional objective of preventing the 
French fleet's departure. Shrewsbury's correspondence with the admiral showed that he 
shared this assumption, although significantly, before Russell's return from his 
reconnaissance, the secretary went beyond the April instructions to outline a possible 
scenario which envisaged both an attack on Brest and the fleet sailing south. The suggestion 
was that if the French fleet had left the harbour, then Russell would lead a squadron to the 
Mediterranean in pursuit, but that the detachment which would have to be left behind to 
guard the Narrow Seas could undertake the descent. Upon hearing that Brest harbour was 
empty the king's reaction was almost exactly along these lines.(59) The descent was now 
being uncoupled from the policy of preventing a conjunction of the two French squadrons. It 
stood independently as an assault to destroy Brest harbour and any ship contained within. 
Admittedly, the possible strategic benefits which might accrue both in the Channel 
sad the Mediterranean from knocking out Frances principal northern port were not explained, 
leaving the operation vulnerable to the charge that it was purposeless.(60) 
 
To an extent, the administrative organization of the descent force had already prepared the 
ground for a refinement of the orders contingent upon the new independence of the 
operation. During May, as Trenchard laboured to expedite the preparations, a warrant for the 
embarkation of the troops aboard the ships left by Russell at Spithead under Shovell's 
command directed Tollemache to consult with the admiral on how best the force might be 
used for 'annoying the enemy'.(61) No mention was made of the descent's previous purpose 
as one option for preventing the egress of the French fleet, although equally it was not 
specifically stated that Brest was to be targeted regardless. That clarification only came 
some weeks after Russell had concluded his reconnaissance when, on 29 May, Lord 
Berkeley, who was to command the Channel squadron that was now to be detached from 
Russell's main fleet, was given a squadron list along with a set of instructions: these clearly 
directed Berkeley to undertake the descent upon Brest, although a council of war was to 
decide the actual plan of attack.(62) 
 
On 31 May, after Russell had brought his ships up from Torbay (where he had put in after his 
reconnaissance mission) to Spithead and the two squadrons had weighed to sail down the 
Channel, a council was convened aboard Russell's flagship, the Britannia. Probably because 
the only access to Brest and its harbour was through a tight channel called the Goulet, the 
council decided against a direct attack and instead resolved to land the troops at Camaret 
Bay on the shore line of the Roscanvel Peninsula. This was the southern of two bays 
(Bertheaume Bay being the other to the north on the shore of the Plateau du Léon) which 
flanked the entrance to the Goulet and, if the peninsula could be secured, then batteries 
might be established not only to bombard Brest but also to provide cover fire for the fleet as 
it proceeded up the Goulet to conduct its own bombardment of the harbour.(63) 
 
In formulating this plan the council was not wholly ignorant of the potential opposition which 
might be encountered. Intelligence had come through that Louis XIV had dispatched his 
celebrated engineer, Vauban, to Brest and that he was busily improving its defences and 
those on the attendant coastline; there had also been reports of significant numbers of 
French foot and horse being transferred to the region. Childs points to a series of 'Letters 
from Brest' mentioned in the London Gazette of 4 June which specifically note trenches and 
extensive batteries, and upwards of 9,000 troops in the area; he questions why — given that 
Tollemache was in receipt of at least one of these letters before sailing — the operation was 
not called off. Only recklessness or a sense of confidence that the force was sufficient to 
combat the French can provide the answer.(64) 
 
The two squadrons had sailed together for just less than a week when, on 5 June, they 
parted upon their respective missions.(65) Once Berkeley had brought his Anglo-Dutch fleet 
of some twenty-nine warships, fireships, bomb and machine vessels safely round the Île 
d'Ouessant, he called a council of war. This upheld the principal resolutions of 31 May 
regarding the landing site at Camaret Bay and the subsequent progress of the fleet through 
the Goulet, but it considerably refined the landing disposition. The Monck and the Dutch 
frigate the Damiaten were to engage Vauban's recently built redoubt at the bay as the troops 
landed; a naval lieutenant was to command each landing boat; and Major-General Lord 
Cutts secured agreement that not only should 600 grenadiers land as a vanguard but that 
fifty of them should initially be put ashore to assess the strength of the enemy 
entrenchments. Lastly, the council expressed its intent to land that evening or at least for the 
squadron to stand as far into the bay as circumstances would allow. 
 
Several auxiliary vessels and even some ships had fallen too far astern for any progress to 
be made on the night of 6/7 June and it was the following afternoon before the fleet 
anchored in the water between Camaret and Bertheaume bays. On coming to this 
anchorage, a shortening of the wind had forced the fleet upon a double tack, thus exposing it 
to fire from the batteries posted at both bays as well as those situated at the Point des 
Minoux and the Point des Filletes on the north and south sides of the Goulet. Fortunately, 
none of this ordnance struck home. Curiously though, Tollemache ignored the extent of this 
fire when, on returning from a reconnaissance of Camaret Bay, he reported that there were 
neither batteries nor trenches nearby, and with only Camaret fort presenting an obstacle, he 
predicted that the landing would take place without any opposition. Either on a separate 
survey mission or accompanying Tollemache (the sources are not clear on this point) the 
marquess of Carmarthen and Cutts came to a different conclusion about the extent of the 
French defensive preparations. Returning to the flagship, they argued vigorously to Berkeley 
that additional ships be sent in with the two already designated to bombard the fort at 
Camaret Bay, so that fire might be directed against any enemy troops, which they believed 
would mount considerable opposition to the landing. In accordance with his instructions, 
Berkeley referred these matters to the council which was to assemble in the early hours of 
the following morning. 
 
Thick fog at first light on 8 June kept the signal for the council unposted for some four hours, 
and when the cloud lessened, allowing the council to meet, it also revealed several 
squadrons of enemy horse on the hills rising behind Camaret Bay.(66) Clearly the 
reconnaissance of Carmarthen and Cutts had been more keenly observed than 
Tollemache's efforts. More importantly, it underscored their argument for an increase in the 
naval detachment which would act as cover for the landing. Accordingly the council resolved 
that an additional six vessels would follow the Monck and the Damiaten into the bay. 
Carmarthen offered to undertake, and was given, the task of positioning these latter two 
vessels first and then returning to lead in the remaining six. Meanwhile, the soldiers had 
been embarking in the landing boats in the previously agreed descent order by which 
Venner's regiment would follow the grenadiers on to the beach, with the other battalions then 
descending in reinforcing sequential waves. 
 
In the event, as the landing boats began to follow Carmarthen's detachment into the bay this 
order was lost — inexcusably given that there was a naval commander in each boat and that 
the calm weather should have made it easier to manoeuvre these small oared crafts. 
Conversely, the tranquil weather conditions made Carmarthen's task much harder. In the 
calm both the Monck and the Damiaten had to be towed into position which was not only a 
laborious and finely-balanced manoeuvre but also caused a gap to open up between them 
and the other ships, now numbering only five as the Greenwich had failed to join the 
detachment. The two warships were exposed to a considerable bombardment from the west 
side of Camaret Bay and the Point des Filletes before they could either bring their broadside 
guns to bear or the other vessels arrived in support. Moreover, Carmarthen quickly 
appreciated that he faced a greater number of batteries - three emplacements with a total of 
fourteen guns around Camaret church with another redoubt of up to six guns behind the fort 
— than even his reconnaissance had predicted, and that to combat this he would have to 
alter the naval detachment's position in the bay. Forced to visit each ship individually to 
communicate the new positions, critical time was lost as this inshore detachment failed to 
achieve any superiority over the shore defences, still less to establish an effective fire 
support for the beach landing. 
 
The extent of the enemy preparations to oppose the assault also demoralized the landing 
party as it approached the shore line. Tollemache's aide, Captain Green, understated 
matters when, on spying three batteries to the right and two to left of the beach, in addition to 
its three trenches containing troops and another battery, and the 150 musketeers positioned 
to provide flanking fire, he noted that the men were 'not very forward to land'.(67) It was not, 
however, just the men who appeared to waver as small arms and ordnance fire began to rain 
down amongst the boats. Belying the sobriquet 'Salamander', which he was subsequently to 
gain for stolidity under fire, Cutts failed to organize the fifty pre-vanguard grenadiers. 
Consequently, Tollemache was forced to cry out to the brigadier to effect the landing and in 
so doing questioned Cutts's commitment to his orders, although in fairness to Cutts, he had 
previously argued that the operation should be abandoned if the fifty grenadiers found the 
enemy entrenchments heavily defended by regular troops — a fact which was clearly 
apparent without any troop landings. Nonetheless, Cutts's views had not been officially 
adopted by the council of war and, crucially, his vacillation in command forced Tollemache to 
land precipitously with only four other officers and nine grenadiers.(68) 
 
Leading up from the beach, about thirty yards from the shore, were some rocks which 
provided cover for Tollemache and his colleagues while they awaited more troops. Although 
remaining in his boat, Cutts had now began to organize the grenadiers and a party of 150 
was landed. Tollemache, along with the other officers, moved from the cover of the rocks to 
lead this group up the beach but, lacking numbers and without adequate covering fire from 
the vessels in the bay, this party was badly galled by the French batteries. La Motte and 
many of the grenadiers were killed, while Tollemache was shot in the thigh (a wound from 
which he was subsequently to die when it became gangrenous back in England) and he 
struggled back to the shelter of the rocks again with Green and Montargier.(69) A further 200 
grenadiers next made it onto the shore and Tollemache, despite his wound, went to rally 
them for an attack up the beach. Carmarthen's naval detachment was still making no impact 
upon the French batteries whose fire, along with some French marines, killed many English 
troops and forced the rest to retreat to the boats. For a third time, Tollemache was back 
under the rocks with his two colleagues. Just then, Green spied a considerable party of 
French horse making its way down to the beach and, fearing a rout, he was able to persuade 
a reluctant Tollemache that the descent could not succeed. Further ignominy was to attend 
the general before he could leave the bay. The ebb tide at landing had stranded many of the 
boats on the beach and, with desertions amongst the crews, refloating was proving difficult. 
After lifting Tollemache into a boat, Green faced this problem, and had to bribe the crew of 
Berkeley's long-boat to help get the general safely off the shore. The spirit of combined army 
and navy operational endeavour here was somewhat defective. 
 
As Tollemache's boat reached the relative safety of the flagship, whence he was quickly 
transferred with a surgeon to the Dreadnought, the earl of Macclesfield and Carmarthen 
were left to withdraw the remaining land and naval forces. Theirs was an unenviable task. 
Macclesfield, although not on the beach, had to bring off the remaining grenadiers as the 
French party of horse bore down, and also turn around the other landing craft still burdened 
with their troops. Carmarthen, meanwhile, had to put about his detachment of ships whose 
rigging and masts had been badly damaged during their engagement with the fort and shore 
batteries. Given the progress of the descent to that point, it was perhaps remarkable that 
only the Dutch vessel, the Wesep, and four landing boats (from which approximately fifty 
grenadiers were taken prisoner) had to be abandoned. However, combined with the 1,091 
seamen and troops killed, wounded and missing, this represented an additional failure which 
had to be addressed by the council when it convened that afternoon on board the 
Dreadnought.(70) 
 
The council quickly fixed upon the extent of the French defences as the principal cause of 
the descent's failure, but when Tollemache suggested that a small squadron be sent to 
bombard Brest, the council demurred on the grounds that it required a prevailing westerly 
and easterly wind respectively to get in and out of Brest, thus raising the prospect of a 
considerable delay while waiting for the appropriate weather conditions. Perhaps more 
revealing, however, were Berkeley's fears about the quantity and capability of French 
ordnance at the town, which he subsequently confided to Trenchard.(71) Accordingly, as the 
fleet, upon the council's direction, returned to Spithead to land the soldiers and await further 
orders, the importance of Vauban's preparations at and around Brest in scuppering the 
descent was reinforced in English minds. Yet, with respect to the execution of the combined 
operation, this perception of the role of the French defences can be shown to be largely a 
tactical and strategic red herring. 
 
First, unwarranted attention is often paid to this issue because of the allegation that it was 
the earl of Marlborough who had betrayed the project to Louis XIV. Childs rightly warns 
against concentrating upon an issue which Marlborough's biographers have exhausted. In 
short, it would seem (assuming the letter is not a forgery) that Marlborough did write to Louis 
about the descent but that his letter was not the first that the French king had received about 
the English plans. Effective operational secrecy was rarely achieved in early modern warfare 
and, as Childs again appositely remarks, Louis's intelligence provision would have had to 
have been exceptionally inadequate for him not to have known, even as early as April (which 
he did), what the English planned. It is also significant that, following the bombardment of St. 
Malo in November 1693, Louis had directed Vauban to make a swift inspection of the 
defences on the Cotentin peninsula and the Brittany coast. So, when intelligence of the 
projected Brest attack was received and Vauban ordered in early May (N.S.) to attend 
specially to the fortifications at Brest and the defences of Camaret and Bertheaume bays, 
improvements at these places had already been on the French king's agenda.(72) Stripped, 
therefore, of the allure of scandal, the defences should be properly placed within the context 
of the operation. 
 
The importance of the batteries and the fortifications in the repulse of the English cannot, 
however, be denied; they were undoubtedly the immediate cause of failure. The 
commanders knew that Vauban had been fortifying the area, and his reputation pointed to 
the defences being considerable. Moreover, it was an assessment of the strength of the 
French position which led to the naval detachment designed for the bay being 
augmented.(73) The descent was launched in the knowledge that it would be opposed and 
probably vigorously so. However, there was also a reasonable hope that this opposition 
could be overcome. Given that context, the tactical reasons for failure must be looked for 
elsewhere. The king was of the opinion that Tollemache's 'too ardent zeal' had caused him to 
act rashly, thereby implying that his military judgement was suspect.(74) Macclesfield also 
made this point, but rather more brutally, when he wrote to Portland after Tollemache's death 
that the 'King has lost a subject but not a General'.(75) It was Shrewsbury who, probably 
inadvertently, provided a credible answer. With few details then to hand, his relation to the 
king of the events at Brest noted the recollections of an unnamed participant that boats had 
run into each other and that too many craft had large draughts which were inappropriate for 
descending upon an ebb tide.(76) The loss of order by the boats - a naval responsibility - as 
they followed Carmarthen's detachment into the bay was critical, for the anticipated strike-
force momentum built-in by the sequential landing disposition could not be realized. 
Moreover, as some boats struggled with the ebb tide and Cutts's irresolution about landing 
the grenadiers took hold, a confusion arose which prevented Tollemache from reordering the 
nearby boats to effect a landing of a good number of troops, even if not in sequential waves. 
Tollemache's military judgement was too severely circumscribed by the conditions, and by 
Cutts's actions, to be at fault; zeal was all he could offer as a substitute. That could not, 
however, remedy the woefully inadequate strike-force of five officers and nine grenadiers 
which was first onto the beach, nor could the additional 350 grenadiers who subsequently 
landed. The tactical deficiency of the descent was simply the failure to submit the French 
opposition to the maximum potential of the English plan. 
 
Strategically, the failure at Brest has been attributed - probably unintentionally given that the 
context of the passage was tactics - to the inflexibility of the operational instructions, which 
were considered to have afforded Tollemache or the other senior commanders no discretion 
in target selection.(77) It follows that, as they were unable to favour an alternative point of 
attack which might have offered better prospects of success when in-theatre, failure was 
largely predetermined — especially given the extent of the French defences at Brest. This 
was an issue which subsequently greatly exercised those involved. After the repulse, the 
afternoon council on 8 June asked Tollemache if he had the authority to mount an attack 
elsewhere. The general claimed then that he did not and maintained this view until his death 
on 22 June. However, Secretary Trenchard was equally adamant in his subsequent 
correspondence that the orders did not restrict Tollemache to land only at Brest and that the 
council of war possessed the sovereign authority to alter any aspect of the operation. 
Certainly, when delayed with the fleet at Spithead, and in receipt of intelligence regarding 
Vauban's work at Brest, Tollemache wrote to the court of his desire to land elsewhere; his 
proponents later claimed that as no reply was offered the general assumed that the attack on 
Brest must proceed regardless. It cannot be established whether the court did reply, but 
before the fleet left England Trenchard reported Tollemache's request to Blathwayt, although 
he misinterpreted it to mean that Tollemache wanted to undertake an additional attack, 
which Trenchard dismissed on the grounds of insufficient resources. The secretary did stress 
to Blathwayt, however, that the operational orders did not fix the assault at a particular place: 
the council of war was to advise on that. Trenchard returned to these points in 
correspondence with Blathwayt after reading the minutes of the council of the afternoon of 8 
June.(78) 
 
The final instructions issued on 29 May hold the answers. In this document Brest is clearly 
stated as the first strike target, and Trenchard was being disingenuous in claiming that no 
particular place had been settled upon, insofar as he meant a wholly different target. The 
instructions only allowed the council full discretion to determine the landing site and the 
tactical deployment of the force at Brest. Tollemache, on the other hand, was guilty of 
ambiguity. His claim that he had no power to order an attack elsewhere was only strictly 
correct in that he could not personally sanction such a move. The instructions expressly 
stipulated that, after the land forces had completed whatever was possible at Brest, a council 
of war was to consider what might be undertaken elsewhere.(79) By prioritizing the targets, 
the instructions lacked the strategic vision which might have allowed for an alternative place 
on the Brittany coast to be attacked in pursuance of the same objectives; if a foothold could 
have been secured on enemy territory then a body of troops might have been dispatched to 
attack Brest from the interior. Tollemache's failure at Brest was not tactical but strategic: he 
was too willing to accept the limitations of the instructions. 
 
In the aftermath of the failure at Brest the king indirectly threw his support behind further 
descents on the northern French coast by confirming that he would not immediately recall 
the soldiers to Flanders and was content for them to be otherwise employed. This caused 
the queen to order Berkeley to hold a council of war of land and sea officers to consider what 
might now be undertaken against the French coasts. With Brest no longer a viable target, the 
council, which assembled on 15 June at St. Helens, seemed bereft of ideas. It rather vaguely 
resolved that the squadron would sail to the northern French coast with the soldiers and the 
bomb vessels to trouble the enemy as much as the weather conditions would allow. This 
proved insufficiently detailed for the queen who, through Trenchard, ordered the fleet to the 
Isle of Wight to land the soldiers until the council decided both upon a particular target and 
the number of troops to be deployed. In his defence of the council's deliberations, Berkeley 
drew upon the military case for descents expressed by Littleton's first pamphlet. The admiral 
chimed that the council's vague resolution to remain ready in sight of the French coast was a 
ploy to keep the enemy guessing about where a landing might take place, thereby forcing 
them to stretch their resources to cover all possible options. Berkeley also claimed the more 
practical motivation that, in light of recent events, it was prudent to keep operational details 
secret. A further council held on 18 June was only a little more specific in its resolutions, 
suggesting Calais, Dieppe and Havre de Grace as possible targets. Four regiments were 
considered sufficient, but it was significant that greater emphasis was placed on their help to 
man the fleet and the bomb vessels rather than as an assault force. The council was now 
promoting bombardment as a form of engagement upon the enemy coast and, in conjunction 
with the increasing impasse between the council and the queen, descents were being 
undermined as a part of the war policy.(80) 
 
Obviously keen that some attack be made against the French coast, the cabinet council 
attempted to push events forward by accepting the council of war's prerogative over 
targeting. The Lords were, however, of the opinion that the full ten battalions should be 
embarked if the council of war's objective remained to keep the enemy resources stretched; 
they believed that this would leave weak points on the coast where the English troops might 
be profitably landed. Consequently, once the king had again confirmed that he did not 
require the troops in Flanders, Berkeley was ordered to embark the ten battalions, with 
Macclesfield as their commander.(81) The admiral and the council of war were, however, 
now settled upon the bombardment of French coastal towns rather than upon troops 
landings. In early July, the Channel squadron set about bombarding Dieppe and Havre de 
Grace, reducing the former to ashes and leaving about two-thirds of the latter ablaze. In 
Berkeley's account of these actions there is no indication that the soldiers were deployed in a 
combined action, other than as help in manning the fleet and the bomb vessels. Just before 
sailing from Dieppe, Berkeley did send the Elizabeth and a brigantine with Colonel Venner in 
command of 200 troop to make an assault upon Treport, but this detachment soon returned 
having failed to effect a landing. In truth, the admiral considered the ten regiments a burden, 
especially since two of his squadron had been withdrawn to escort the victualling ships 
bound for the Mediterranean. He warned that the overcrowding would cause the spread of 
sickness and returned to his claim that four regiments would be sufficient to make good the 
lack of seamen manning the squadron.(82) 
 
The bombardment of Dieppe and Havre de Grace took its toll upon the bomb vessels and 
the ship-borne mortars, and Berkeley's squadron was back on the English coast at the end 
of July for a refit. Permission was then given for him to disembark some of the soldiers if he 
wished, but he was to come to London for discussions on how best the squadron might be 
employed for the remainder of the campaign season. It was decided to target Dunkirk and for 
the rest of the summer attempts were made by the Channel squadron, first under Berkeley 
and then, when the first and second rates had been laid up at the end of August, under 
Shovell, to destroy Dunkirk harbour through bombardment or the explosion of fireships and 
machine vessels. In mid September, Shovell also brought the squadron in front of Calais to 
bombard it.(83) At least four regiments from the original ten were aboard the squadron 
during these attempts but at no point was a landing attempted, nor is there evidence to 
suggest the troops' active participation in the bombardments.(84) In the event, these 
assaults proved largely unsuccessful, although support for them increased as the instrument 
of warfare best directed against the French coastline.(85) A combination of the failure at 
Brest and their subsequent frustration by the commanding admiral and the council of war 
had caused the descents to be dropped as the preferred form of coastal attack. In the 
summer of 1696, a couple of small scale descents - in reality these were little more than 
raids - were undertaken by Berkeley and Captain Messe at Belle Île le, the islands of Houat 
and Hoëdic, and Rhé Island, but it would appear that neither infantry nor marine soldiers 
were involved, and that the brief landings were conducted by the seamen. By mid decade, 
bombardment was the staple form of assault upon France's northern coasts and the only 
combined army and navy operations being deployed in the European theatre were in the 
Mediterranean, through the agency of Russell's fleet.(86)  
 
Two months after leaving Berkeley thirty-seven miles south of Ram Head, Admiral Russell 
led his fleet of sixty-three warships through the Gibraltar Straits and into the Mediterranean. 
July had been spent refitting and revictualling at Cádiz and, in search of the combined 
French fleet, Russell was bound for the waters off Barcelona where Tourville had taken 
station to succour Noailles's army as it advanced on this principal Catalan town.(87) For the 
1694 campaign, Louis XIV had committed large resources to the war in Spain in the hope 
that Noailles could make considerable gains in Catalonia and force the Spanish to a 
separate peace. His calculation was that this would damage the unity of the Grand Alliance 
and perhaps cause the other members to seek individual peace with the French. On 7 May, 
Noailles's army decamped from Le Boulou and, assisted by Tourville's Toulon squadron, 
made good progress. The Fluvia and Ter rivers were crossed by the end of May and at the 
latter the Spanish army, commanded by Catalonia's viceroy the duke of Escalona, was 
defeated. A month later Palamós and Gerona fell to the French who, shadowed by their now 
combined fleet, pressed on towards Barcelona; a siege in early autumn seemed probable. 
However, news of Russell's approach caused Tourville to scurry back to Toulon, believing 
his fleet to be outnumbered by the Anglo-Dutch force. The balance was more even than the 
French admiral thought but his actions had effectively allowed Russell to complete his 
mission of chasing the French from the Mediterranean sea; while it also meant that Noailles 
was without the necessary fleet support to besiege Barcelona.(88) 
 
Running short of provisions and with only a few weeks left in which the larger rated vessels 
could remain at sea, Russell's expectation was that he would shortly head for England. The 
king, however, wishing to consolidate this newly-gained strategic position in the 
Mediterranean, had other ideas. At the end of July, William let it be known to the cabinet 
council that he wanted Russell to continue as long as possible in the Mediterranean and, on 
his departure, to leave a substantial squadron to winter in those parts. William's actual desire 
was for the whole fleet to winter in the Mediterranean but, as political cover, he wanted the 
initiative on this to come from his ministers. However, when the cabinet council vacillated, 
and then issued Russell with instructions which allowed him the option of returning home 
depending upon the stage in his return journey at which he had received these orders, the 
king decided to issue his own instructions on 7 August. These were unequivocal: Russell 
was to use Cádiz as a base and winter with the whole fleet in the Mediterranean; only the 
passage of the French fleet through the Straits would admit Russell's departure. The 
prospect of wintering in the Mediterranean had apparently been raised with Russell earlier in 
the summer, and on that occasion he had argued strongly against it on strategic and 
practical grounds. His immediate reaction on receiving his instructions was no different. It 
was largely due to Shrewsbury's soothing correspondence that Russell accepted the king's 
orders without first embarrassing himself or endangering his command by raising 
objections.(89) William now had the strategic presence in the Mediterranean which he had 
long sought and the 1695 campaign season offered the prospect of converting this into 
territorial gains upon the French Mediterranean coastline, or into tangible diplomatic currency 
by helping the Spaniards to force Noailles back across the Pyrenees. 
 
Aside from the marine soldiers aboard, Russell's fleet had no additional troops to use either 
as a strike force on the French coast or to offer as support to the Spanish army. These 
circumstances had, in 1694, caused him to reject the Spanish viceroy's proposal to augment 
his army for attacks against French positions.(90) Accordingly, it was decided in December 
to boost Russell's capability by dispatching to Cádiz four regiments - about 3,000 men in 
total. The emphasis of command was indeed upon the admiral for, although Brigadier 
Stewart was appointed commanding officer of the regiments, he was to defer to Russell 
about their deployment and Russell was separately commissioned as captain-general. The 
decision had been taken before the turn of the calendar year to ensure that the troops 
arrived in the Mediterranean early in the campaign season, but transport arrangements 
quickly ran into problems. A portion of the troops were to go aboard the victualling convoy 
and bomb vessels set to leave in the spring but for the remainder ships would have to be 
hired. The initial hope that these vessels would be ready to come down the Thames to the 
Downs as soon as the ice melted at the end of January quickly became forlorn as the 
owners proved punctilious in getting protection for their crews in advance of concluding the 
charter party negotiations. Even then the transport ships were slow in getting to the Downs 
whence they were still to sail along the coast to Spithead for the troop embarkation. In late 
March, William had Blathwayt float a proposal to hire ships at Portsmouth instead. When 
Lord Cutts, whom the king had appointed to inspect and embark the soldiers, wrote that 
there was a shortage of 800 berths upon his arrival at Portsmouth, Blathwayt might well have 
wished that he had pushed the proposal further. It was not just the organization of the 
transports which gave rise to delay, for problems emerged during the embarkation process. 
Many of the companies remained unpaid, as a result of their officers' peculation, and it was 
the stifling of an order about Day by an officer which allegedly led to the mutiny of four 
companies of Brigadier Stewart's regiment at Salisbury as they marched to Southampton, 
where they  were  to  board.   Cutts's intelligent management  of these problems ensured 
that they did not proliferate, thus allowing him to complete the embarkation towards the end 
of March. Shortly thereafter, the convoy was reported to be in mid Channel, off St. 
Catherine's point and bolstered by a fair gale from the east and north. Within approximately 
three weeks the troops were with Russell.(91) 
 
A descent on Toulon or at Marseilles - similar in form to that undertaken at Brest - was 
considered by the ministry to be the optimum use of these troops, and the Instructions sent 
to Russell in May prioritized these targets (not ordering their abandonment as Childs 
contends). To bolster the attack, a link-up with soldiers provided by the duke of Savoy, Victor 
Amadeus II, which would march upon the target from the interior, was also mooted and the 
English envoy in Turin, Lord Galway, was attempting to co-ordinate matters. Russell, 
however, first attended to the subordinate part of his instructions which required that he put 
troops into Barcelona to prevent its capture by the French, who were considered likely to 
make it a priority again in the forthcoming campaign. Then he took the fleet to the Îles 
d'Hyeres whence he was able to reconnoitre Toulon, while Rear-Admiral Neville was sent 
with four colonels to assess Marseilles. Both missions reported on the extensive French 
defensive preparations, particularly at Toulon where the French fleet lay, apparently showing 
no signs of putting out. In the interval, Victor Amadeus, having set in train the negotiation 
which would lead to a separate peace with France and Savoy's departure from the Grand 
Alliance, failed to respond to Galway. Russell then returned to the Catalan coast to find that 
the troops were not required in Barcelona, the war in Spain having taken a different course 
from the previous year.(92) 
 
The opportunity for Russell to intervene in the Spanish theatre was a product of the altered 
military realities in Catalonia, where the energy of the new viceroy and army commander, the 
marquis de Gastañaga, caused the Spaniards to take the initiative. In the spring, he moved 
to capture Ostalric and Castelfollit de la Roca and, although on that occasion French relief 
got through, by the end of July the new French commander, the due de Vendôme, had 
abandoned the former town in the face of Gastañaga's second approach. The French had 
retired to Gerona and consequently the viceroy was keen to capture Palamós next, but with 
only an army of 12,000 (many of whom were sick) and, more importantly, lacking the heavy 
ordnance which would be necessary to conduct a successful siege, he sought Russell's 
help.(93) At the beginning of August, after having withdrawn the troops from Barcelona, the 
two commanders held a meeting at Blanes, about half a day's march from the Spanish 
camp, and it was agreed that Russell would provide combined military and naval help.(94) 
 
Initially Gastañaga had rather vaguely proposed that Russell land his troops at Blanes 
whence they would march with the Spanish army to Palamós. The admiral, concerned that 
this held out the prospect of several days' marching, and presumably keen to firm up the 
details of the operation, instead informed the viceroy that he would land up to 4,000 soldiers 
at a bay near Palamós if the siege looked likely to go ahead. Russell also claimed that he 
then informed Gastañaga that he could spare the troops for just over a week and that their 
deployment at the siege should allow for a straightforward embarkation back aboard the fleet 
in the event that the French navy departed from Toulon. Soon after their meeting, Brigadier 
Stewart was set ashore to consult further on military matters, while Russell took the fleet 
south down the coast in anticipation of the troop landings and to deliver the first phase of 
naval support. 
 
On 7 August (N.S.), two bomb vessels were sent into the Bay of Palamós to throw some 
shells as a preliminary to the siege. Two days later, upon Brigadier Stewart's word that the 
military circumstances were propitious, with the French army camp reportedly at least four 
leagues from Palamós at La Bisbal d'Emporda, Russell landed 3,000 English infantry and 
about 500 Dutch troops under Count Nassau in the early hours of the morning at St. Feliu de 
Guíxols. Linking up with the Spanish army which had encamped at Calonge, the whole force 
marched that day to within two miles of Palamós. Covering these final miles the next day, the 
Anglo-Dutch van encountered a considerable body of enemy horse as they entered a defile 
and, although they did not attempt to stop the march, it did contradict the report that the 
French were some days march from Palamós. As the allies settled into their camp just 
outside the town, Vendôme drew up his army to within a mile, posting his horse in the valley 
and foot upon the surrounding hills. The French had effectively checked the initial moves of 
the allied force and, when reports came though that Vendôme was expecting over 4,000 
reinforcements from Rousillon, it seemed unlikely that the allies would be able even to invest 
Palamós. 
 
According to Russell (although it is necessary to keep in mind his contempt for the Spanish) 
the Spanish commanders next panicked and, expecting a battle the following day, they 
transferred all power of command to Stewart. In the event, an engagement did not occur. 
The allies occupied and began fortifying some high ground so that when on 12 August the 
French marched forward to inspect their opponent's position, they wheeled north and left for 
the neighbouring town of Palafrugell. Perhaps they felt the allied position too strong or were 
surprised at the size of the Spanish army, given that they were probably unaware of the 
arrival of troops from England. Whatever the reasons, twenty-four hours had been sufficient 
to make the siege of Palamós appear a realistic proposition. 
 
It took a similar period of time to bring this operation to an end. Over 12-13 August (N.S.), 
Russell had delivered the second phase of naval support. Bomb vessels and ketches with 
mortars were towed into Palamós Bay to throw their shells at the town, and were exacting 
considerable damage, when a frigate, which had previously been dispatched on an 
intelligence gathering mission along the Provence coast, returned. The captain had taken 
two Toulon fishermen prisoner and they claimed that the French fleet of sixty warships was 
now lying in Toulon Road, armed and ready to sail. In order to prevent them passing through 
the Straits, Russell wished to go in search of them and, once a council of war had 
sanctioned his resolution, he informed Gastañaga that he was recalling his troops so he 
could leave the Catalan coast. The Spanish viceroy protested, not least because he had just 
begun to press the siege forward by landing heavier ordnance brought down from Barcelona, 
but Russell remained firm. A debate on the viability of continuing with the siege of Palamós 
followed, although the sources place different emphasis upon the participants. In his 
correspondence with Shrewsbury, Russell gave himself a central role in pressing the futility 
of the operation; he foresaw the principal difficulty as that — even with the troops he had put 
ashore — the total number would be insufficient to combat the French relief army currently at 
Palafrugell but which could return at any point. Another source emphasized instead the 
discussions that took place between Gastañaga, his Spanish colleagues and the imperial 
officer, the prince of Hesse-Darmstadt. During these consultations, Hesse-Darmstadt heard 
what he considered were defeatist, even treacherous, remarks by the Spanish commanders 
to the effect that the English fleet was of no service to Spain and that a separate peace 
treaty would be of greater benefit. He accordingly withdrew the imperial troops and this was 
thought to have caused the siege to be abandoned. All such discussions probably 
contributed to the demise of the action, but with regard to the combined operation, it is 
Russell's account of his own behaviour which is of interest. 
 
Since arriving in the Mediterranean, Russell had made no secret of his contempt for the 
Spanish in general and their military competence in particular.(95) He agreed to Gastañaga's 
request for aid, but inserted a qualification about how long he could have the troops ashore 
and as soon as intelligence came through which allowed him to recall his troops, he did so. 
Yet, the urgency that he protested was necessary to prevent the French fleet from passing 
through the Straits did not seem to extend to embarking the troops. They were not put 
aboard until 16 August (N.S.) and then Russell, at Gastañaga's request, agreed to support 
his army as they marched away from Palamós, all the while passing further derogatory 
comment upon the Spanish. Such conduct begs the question whether this was another 
example of Russell's equivocation about combined operations, similar to that displayed in 
1692 and over the descent on Brest in 1694. 
 
The intelligence about the French fleet's imminent departure proved to have been a ruse 
concocted by Vendôme. When Russell arrived off Toulon the fleet were found to be still in 
the harbour, although he was unable to determine the extent of their preparations for sea as 
bad weather forced him off station. By then, however, any further combined action on the 
Spanish coast could not be contemplated and, although the French did evacuate from 
Palamós and Castelfollit de la Roca, they maintained a presence in Catalonia. In October, 
leaving a squadron of ships under Vice-Admiral David Mitchell, which Sir George Rooke was 
on his way to augment, Russell returned to England. He took all the troops with him - save 
for a couple of companies from Colonel Pusissar's regiment - and there were to be no further 
combined operations in the Mediterranean. For the remaining two years of the war, England 
maintained a squadron in the Mediterranean sufficient for the protection of trade, but without 
the military capability to intervene decisively on the French or Spanish coasts. Indeed, 
Barcelona fell to the French in 1697.(96) The abandonment of descents or combined 
operations as part of the war strategy in the northern European theatre had been quickly 
followed in the southern Mediterranean region. 
 
In various guises, and with limited success, England's war policy in the European theatre 
during the Nine Years' War embraced combined operations as a strategic instrument of war, 
but not in a manner that served to revolutionize the military component of the court's Grand 
Strategy. It is important to understand, however, that this was never the contemporary 
aspiration for these operations; and the condemnation - offered principally by Childs - of the 
supposed Grand Strategic ambition of these combined operations tilts at an historical illusion 
as to their operational purpose. 
 
Combined operations as descents in the European theatre were motivated by differing 
strategic and tactical reasons. The potential (as articulated in Littleton's pamphlets) of the 
proposed landings in Normandy to alter the balance of force in Flanders was recognized, 
while there were obvious immediate maritime benefits to be gained from destroying or 
capturing coastal ports such as Brest. Moreover, the targeting of the latter in the sixteen-
nineties contributed indirectly but substantially to the grander naval ambition of establishing 
England as the preponderant power in the Mediterranean. In these respects, combined 
operations should be appropriately looked upon as embedded within the Grand Strategy, 
and, depending upon the ascendancy of the whigs or tories in the ministry, as contributing to 
their favoured continental or maritime policies. The whigs' commitment to William's 
campaigning on the European continent disposed them to arguments regarding the 
diversionary capacity in the land theatre of descents, while the tories were keen to link the 
amphibious capability to the maritime standard. 
 
This political split on strategy was more general than absolute, however. The king, principally 
advised by Blathwayt, kept a tight rein over war policy and, in the context of the European 
theatre, emerged as the most relevant champion of the combined operation in either a 
maritime or continental context. Indeed, such was the level of William's commitment that the 
descents on the northern French coast were allowed to continue longer than their manifest 
failure admitted and, although the fleet may have wintered in the Mediterranean for the first 
time in 1694— 5, its combined operational deployment in the following campaign season 
made little impact. A history of operational failure should not, however, obscure the positive 
choice that William and his ministries made to deploy combined operations in the European 
theatre as handmaidens to the broader continental and maritime strategies which were 
developed to combat French military power during the Nine Years' War. 
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